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China cold war news this morning


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2019 Feb 21, 1:01pm   5,238 views  22 comments

by Heraclitusstudent   ➕follow (8)   💰tip   ignore  

\
On Bloomberg TV.

- to build solar power station in space, its own space station, support private rockets, its own GPS network, some satellite repair capabilities that the US military say could be used to attack its satellites.

- China to keep pushing for an Asian centered world, possibly redefining Saudis alliances.

- Throw some agriculture chips to the US in exchange for more industrial dominance.

- Some US business men starting to wise up.

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1   Heraclitusstudent   2019 Feb 21, 1:05pm  

+ Americans distracted by Bernie while the moon is turning commie.
3   Heraclitusstudent   2019 Feb 21, 4:03pm  

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-21/china-military-threat-seeking-new-islands-to-conquer
“We are deeply concerned about the US long-term commitment in the region, starting with troops in South Korea – especially in the face of China and their determined military expansion,” a senior Japanese official told me.
...
This is compounded as they watch China increase pressure on Taiwan to accept a “one nation, two systems” deal a la Hong Kong and militarize the South China Sea by constructing artificial islands.
...
Japan, in particular, faces a host of challenges from Beijing. These begin with a long and bitter history of conflict, principally stemming from the Second World War but also dating back to the Sino-Japanese War more than a century ago. Other areas of contention include China’s unfounded territorial claims including the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea; support for North Korea’s Kim Jung Un, who has launched ballistic missiles over the Japanese islands; alleged hacks into Tokyo’s intelligence and military command systems; and the intellectual property theft that has also frustrated the U.S. so deeply. Singapore, given its geographic position as the gateway to the Indian Ocean, is a key stepping stone in China’s military expansion and its massive One Belt-One Road development project.
...
There is also a less-noticed but extremely worrisome aspect to China’s increasing boldness: It seems to be building its naval capability to dominate farther into the Pacific -- as far as what Western analysts call the “second island chain.”
...
U.S. officials warn that Chinese strategists are becoming more ambitious, set on gaining influence running to the second island chain -- running from Japan through the Micronesian islands to the tip of Indonesia. As with its initial forays into the South China Sea, Beijing is using “scientific” missions and hydrographic surveying ships as the tip of the spear.

Japan and Singapore are essentially anchors at the north and south ends the island chains. They have been integrating their defense capabilities with the U.S. through training, exercises and arms purchases. They are exploring better relations with India as the Pacific and Indian Oceans are increasingly viewed as a single strategic entity. This is a crucial element in the U.S. strategy for the region. But there are changes coming.

First, there are expectations that China will eye the third island chain, encompassing Hawaii and the Alaskan coast before dropping south down to New Zealand. This has long been regarded as the final line of strategic demarcation between the U.S. and China. Second, some analysts are beginning to talk about a fourth and even fifth island chain, both in the Indian Ocean, an increasingly crucial zone of competition between the U.S. and China.

Two obvious Indian Ocean chains exist. The first would run from southern Pakistan (where China has created a deep-water port at Gwador) down past Diego Garcia, the lonely atoll controlled by the U.K. from which the U.S. runs enormous logistical movements into Central Asia. As a junior officer on a Navy cruiser in the 1980s, I visited Diego Garcia when it was essentially a fuel stop with a quaint palm-thatched bar. The base has expanded enormously, becoming critical to supporting U.S. and British combat efforts in the Horn of Africa and Middle East.

The fifth and final island chain could be considered to run from the Horn of Africa – where the U.S. and China now maintain significant military bases – down to the coast of South Africa. Little wonder the U.S. military has renamed its former Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command.

Each of the island chains will be a line contention. Both U.S. and Chinese war plans encompass protocols for employing land-based forces from the various islands to project power to sea.

Japan and Singapore are keenly aware of the geographic importance of the Pacific island chains, as are more distant allies such as Australia and New Zealand. How the U.S. Navy integrates forces with allies and partners, and develops cogent plans to use the islands should matters come to blows (as bases for long-range air, intelligence gathering, and logistic resupply) will be crucial.

None of this means the U.S. is locked into an inevitable war with China, despite some foreign-policy mandarins’ predictions to the contrary. The most helpful analogy may be the so-called Great Game between the U.K. and Russia for control of South Asia in the 19th century. But in today’s world, both the U.S. and China have broader global ambitions and larger international trade empires to defend. Control of the island chains, with Japan and Singapore at the most crucial points in the Pacific, can give either great power the upper hand.
4   FortWayneAsNancyPelosiHaircut   2019 Feb 21, 7:32pm  

Our liberals are too busy figuring out how to promote feminism and gay shit. Building future isn’t their concern.
5   Heraclitusstudent   2019 Feb 21, 9:47pm  

Just one day of news. Is Bloomberg targeting me with this?
Why is everyone happy ignoring this while bickering about trivial stuff?
6   deepcgi   2019 Feb 21, 11:10pm  

Interesting that I revived my 9-dashed line thread a few minutes ago, before seeing yours. I’ll leave the depth of this issue in your capable hands. Mine goes in another direction entirely, for those who are curious. It is yet another threat.
7   anonymous   2019 Feb 27, 1:24am  

Some in US fear Donald Trump will settle for a weak trade deal with China to avoid tanking the financial markets

US President Donald Trump’s potential trade deal with China might temporarily soothe relations between the world’s two largest economies without actually tackling the big issues that drove Trump to impose duties.

Trump on Monday announced that the two nations were getting “very, very close” to a deal and said Chinese negotiators would be returning to Washington for additional talks before he and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet to sign a pact.

Those remarks came a day after the president said he’d delay plans to raise tariffs on US$200 billion in Chinese goods if there’s no deal by March 2.

That’s raising fears among some advisers and lawmakers who support a tough position on China that Trump’s ready to settle for a weaker deal to avoid tanking the financial markets, which have been volatile as he ramped up tariff threats.

Senate Finance Chairman Chuck Grassley, a Republican, tweeted on Monday that he hoped Trump “won’t take a half deal as a good deal”.
The final deal needs to contain structural changes and enforcement mechanisms or else China “will continue cheating and stealing our IP/trade secrets,” Grassley said.

“I consider this entire exercise a fraud,” said Derek Scissors, a China analyst at the American Enterprise Institute who has advised the Trump administration on the negotiations.

The final pact will mostly require China to make large additional purchases of US goods and make “a number of unenforceable promises just like we had in the Bush and the Obama administrations,” Scissors said.

That's far short of the structural reforms the Trump administration has been seeking, especially when it comes to the Chinese practice of pressuring American companies to hand over valuable technology to access the huge Chinese market.

Trump decided in November he wanted an agreement that would end the dispute because of his concern over growing stock market losses, Scissors said.

At one point in late December, the Dow Jones Industrial Average was down more than 5,000 points from its 2018 peak in October.
Since then, the market has rebounded and is trading above 26,000 again as Trump signalled his intention to de-escalate the trade war.

A former US trade official also said she was increasingly pessimistic about the outcome of the talks, especially if the final deal comes down to a meeting between Trump and Xi, as Trump has said could happen.

“That’s not very good for our negotiating position to leave it to a dinner or a day-long meeting between the presidents,” said Amy Celico, a principal at the Albright Stonebridge Group, a Washington-based business advisory firm.

Presidential summits are often used as action-forcing events. But the usual course is for senior officials to essentially strike the deal before the leaders meet, rather than wait for the meeting to actually happen to reach the final agreement.
It was always ambitious to push for an agreement within the 90-day time frame set by Trump late last year, given the depth of reforms the United States is asking China to make.

But rather than recalibrate his approach, Trump “still talks about wanting to have a full-fledged agreement, and just based on the past few days, my pessimism is we’re going to accept a half-loaf,” Celico said.

“That’s not good for us. Ironically, it’s not good for China’s economic development, either, although President Xi and his government will take it and run.”

Still, US Agriculture Secretary Sonny Perdue told reporters on Monday that Trump would not be satisfied by a simple Chinese pledge to buy more US soybeans and other products.

“The structural core issues of intellectual property transfer have to be dealt with. We will not be bought off as a country over purchases without eliminating some of the [non-tariff] trade barriers that have existed in China, and make sure they have enforceability provisions going forward,” Perdue said.

But Scissors, a China hawk, says there is still sharp disagreement within the administration over how to enforce the agreement, and that is making it difficult to get meaningful commitments from Beijing.

US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer supports a tough enforcement mechanism, but he is opposed by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, who is more concerned about reaching an agreement than making sure Beijing follows through, Scissors said.

Trump announced Sunday he was delaying the planned March 2 tariff increase because negotiations with Beijing had made “substantial progress” in areas such as intellectual property, currency, services and agriculture.

Trump said he expected the Chinese delegation, which was led by Vice-Premier Liu He, to return “quickly” for more talks before he and Xi meet for a “signing summit”.

As of yet, there is no date for the next round of talks as well as a Xi-Trump meeting, although administration officials have indicated it would most likely take place at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort property in Florida in March.

Neither USTR or Treasury responded on Monday to requests for more details on where things stand in the negotiations, including how much of the text has been finalised and what, if any, new deadline would be set in the talks. A White House spokesperson referred questions to USTR.
USTR has to publish a Federal Register notice to delay the March 2 duty increase, just as it did in December, when Trump agreed to delay the initial December 31 deadline.

Lighthizer, who is Trump’s lead negotiator in the talks with Beijing, is due to testify before the House Ways and Means Committee on Wednesday, where he’s certain to face a number of questions over the status of the China talks.

Ways and Means Chairman Richard Neal, a Democrat, said Monday he was worried that Trump was giving up his leverage in order to reach a subpar deal.

“It seems the president has already decided that he's going to have a deal and that he will announce it with President Xi at Mar-a-Lago,” Neal said in a statement to POLITICO.

“We are asking the same question that we've been asking since May 2018 [when Trump began threatening tariffs on China]: Is there anything in this deal that will credibly address the long-standing problems our workers and our economy face competing with a Chinese economy that doesn't operate on the basis of market principles or basic rights for workers?” Neal added.

Trump supporters also expressed concern that the president’s decision to delay the tariff increase previously scheduled for this Saturday signals the president’s desire to reach a quick deal to keep stock market investors happy.

“We urge President Trump to continue focusing on the long-term national interests of the American people and resist short-term pressure from Wall Street,” said Dan DiMicco and Michael Stumo, the chairman and CEO, respectively, of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, in a joint statement.

They also expressed concern about the enforceability of the agreement, particularly if Trump were to lift all of the tariffs he has imposed on US$250 billion worth of Chinese goods as part of any agreement.

“We know from the mistakes of past presidents that previous promises by Beijing were not kept,” the CPA leaders said.

“Enforcement mechanisms must be clear, strong, and quick. China must agree not to retaliate if enforcement of any agreement occurs.”
Celico said she believed USTR was pushing hard to keep the existing tariffs in place, and to only lift them once China has addressed US concerns about the pressure American companies face to transfer valuable technology to Chinese companies in order to gain market access.
However, Trump initially hit only US$50 billion worth of Chinese goods with a 25 per cent duty as a result of a USTR investigation into the matter.
He imposed the 10 per cent duty on another US$200 billion worth of Chinese goods only because Beijing retaliated against his initial duties.
That could leave some room for Trump to remove the tariffs on the US$200 billion in Chinese goods if China removes its retaliation, Scissors said.

But it’s unclear if China will remove its retaliation if the United States insists on keeping the initial 25 per cent tariff on US$50 billion worth of Chinese goods in place, he said.

Other issues, such as the fate of criminal fraud charges against Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, could also hinge on a Trump-Xi meeting.

Trump acknowledged that possibility last week, although chief White House economic adviser Larry Kudlow stressed on Sunday that the issue was “principally a legal matter”.

But “if Trump is our chief negotiator, you know President Xi is going to talk about Huawei and President Trump already opened that door,” Celico said.

https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/2187864/some-us-fear-donald-trump-will-settle-weak-trade

https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/26/trump-us-china-trade-deal-1211849
8   HeadSet   2019 Feb 27, 7:31am  

Heraclitusstudent says
+ Americans distracted by Bernie while the moon is turning commie.


Well, Mars is already Red............
9   MisdemeanorRebel   2019 Feb 27, 11:14am  

Heraclitusstudent says
- to build solar power station in space, its own space station, support private rockets, its own GPS network, some satellite repair capabilities that the US military say could be used to attack its satellites.


Stupid ass Space Shuttle, we'd have those by now.
10   Heraclitusstudent   2019 Feb 27, 2:47pm  

MisterLearnToCode says
Stupid ass Space Shuttle, we'd have those by now.

They probably have some kind of robot remotely controlled satellites that could attack other satellites.
Humans in space is a luxury.
11   anonymous   2019 Mar 1, 3:10am  

US debt in line of fire from China trade deal - Fed chairman and BlackRock CEO see trouble ahead for global markets

Jerome Powell and Larry Fink are having a bonding experience in regard to China. No, the Federal Reserve chairman and BlackRock CEO aren’t necessarily close friends – or sharing notes. But their recent comments on US debt and changing Chinese priorities track in ways that spell trouble for global markets.

Powell is worried that “federal government debt is on an unsustainable path.” That sober warning to lawmakers on Capitol Hill seems like quintessential central-banker speak, the kind that could’ve come from predecessors Janet Yellen, Ben Bernanke or Alan Greenspan.

But then none of them held the reins as Washington’s debt load hit the US$22 trillion mark. They didn’t live in fear that a bad US debt auction or two might send yields skyrocketing and confront the Fed with control problems. Nor did they have to worry about America’s top bankers in Asia.

China alone holds nearly $1.2 trillion of US government IOUs.

That brings us to Fink’s contribution to this story. The money-management whale worries about Chinese demand, but not for the most commonly cited reason. Most worry that Xi Jinping’s government will dump US debt to hurt America. Fink thinks the real risk is that what happens if China does what Donald Trump wants: buy lots more US goods.

“Now as China reduces its trade deficit with the US, the likelihood of them reducing their need for US Treasuries is large,” Fink told CNBC on February 24.

It follows that the Treasury Department will, over time, lose the most important enabler of US imbalances. “Over the next few years,” Fink explained, “we should expect over the number of years ahead, less ownership of US Treasuries as their deficits shrink. But that’s at the same time the US deficit still seems to be growing at a trillion dollars” per year.

It’s here where Powell’s monetary challenges bond with Fink’s long-term concerns. Europe and China, remember, are working behind the scenes to win a greater share of global transactions in euros and yuan. Might the fiscal profligacy of the Trump era drive Asian central banks to swap dollars for debt issued in other currencies?

Prudence on the part of Asia’s reserve managers may indeed warrant diversification. And given China’s trajectory – it’s already the biggest trading nation – transacting in yuan makes perfect sense. So long as Beijing gets the foundations unpinning the currency right, of course.

Trump’s erraticness is a growing concern. The hope for China, Japan and other key US bankers is that in 2020, Americans elect a more stable and pro-trade leader. If not, that means nearly six more years of Trumpian chaos to undermine America’s credit rating. That could include efforts to devalue the dollar.

At the very least, expect Trump’s Republican Party to enact tax cuts on top of the $1.5 trillion number they did on Washington’s balance sheet in 2018. Predictably, spin that the cut would pay for itself was bunk. Revenues fell at least 2.7%, or $83 billion, from 2017. That, as Washington’s debt explodes in plain sight.

America’s widening deficit would seem more manageable if the US Treasury had a deeper pipeline of bankers fronting its trillions of dollars. At the moment, it follows, Powell’s worries are just that. Yet, as China and other big Asian economies require fewer US bonds, or find alternatives to Trump’s chaos, Fink’s scenario makes Powell’s come to fruition.

This argument can be extended beyond China. At the moment, Japan is run by a Trump acolyte. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has supported and boosted Trump at every turn, while not criticizing a trade war devastating Japanese exporters. Even Abe, though, might have a hard time convincing his Liberal Democratic Party to keep nearly $1.1 trillion of state cash in Trump’s care.

What of Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Singapore and South Korea? “The idea that deficits don’t matter for countries that can borrow in their own currency I think is just wrong,” Powell said. That’s why, he added, politicians should be looking to “spend less or raise more revenue.”

Yet even if US-China trade talks go Trump’s way, this is a be-wary-of-what you-wish-for moment for this White House. “We’re going to see some winners, we’re going to see some losers,” Fink said. “But long term, the US Treasury bid is a loser in this.” Global markets, too.

https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/02/article/us-debt-in-line-of-fire-from-china-trade-deal/
12   anonymous   2019 Mar 6, 6:23am  

The Possible Chinese-US Trade Deal

The two countries are currently negotiating on a wide set of issues. Without agreement, the US threatens to raise tariffs on imports from China, initially planned for March 1st and then indefinitely postponed by President Trump in light of the “substantial progress” achieved.

The Financial Times reports that the final deal, in the absence of last-minute surprises, should touch upon the most important issues affecting the Sino-American relationship. First, the enormous bilateral Chinese trade surplus will be partially countervailed by Beijing commitment to importing a number of US products, in particular agricultural ones (such as soybeans, corn and wheat).

Second, Chinese authorities would pledge greater protection of intellectual property rights, so far one of the most acute points of contention between the two countries, given the allegedly China-led theft of US trade secrets and the well-known transfer of technology necessary for American firms to operate in the Chinese market. Third, and relatedly, China is expected to loosen regulatory requirements for foreign companies and to ease authorisations to international investments.

Fourth, the US demanded commitment from Beijing to ensure renminbi’s stability, in order to prevent competitive currency devaluations that would further worsen US trade deficit vis-a-vis China. In exchange, tariffs on Chinese exports would not be increased as planned, and the charges against Huawei and its chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou might be dropped as (an unofficial) part of the deal.

The importance of the agreement is underlined by the extent and variety of reactions, which largely differ in identifying winners and key issues of the deal. Is Trump about to fix a long-lasting asymmetry in international trade, or is the deal a Pyrrhic victory that only allows the president to claim success on a couple of campaign promises, without addressing the roots of American structural imbalances? Is the deal asymbolic triumph of the Chinese way of managing political and economic developments, or slowing growth prospects are legitimately worrying the Chinese Communist establishment, threatened by mounting discontent?

Michael Schuman on Bloomberg argues that the overall outcome is favorable to Chinese interests, while it undermines long-term US credibility. In fact, Chinese concessions are limited and in line with Beijing’s plans, such as reducing the deficit or improving the protection of intellectual property rights. In exchange, the United States counteracts its own interests in three related ways: first, by incentivising state-led solutions instead of pushing for greater space for market forces; second, by affecting the reputation of its judicial system, whose decisions should not be informed by political and economic considerations; third, by jeopardising its credibility in future negotiations, which will soon be needed given the fragility of the expected agreement.

The contrast between Trump’s short-term political gain and durable geopolitical risks arising from the deal is also at the centre of Paul Krugman’s opinion piece, which warns about the consequences on the trade conflict with the EU. The latter, in contrast with China, is not able to force its resident private companies to pursue political goals. This implies that autocracies have a relative advantage when dealing with President Trump compared to countries respecting the rule of law. The outsized relevance of the president’s personality and desire for “tweetable deliveries” in the context of trade negotiations therefore has a troubling impact on US foreign policy.

Many commentators focus on the relative importance of the part of the deal devoted to currency issues. Colby Smith, on FT Alphaville, highlights the importance of deciphering what a “stable” renminbi (as demanded in the deal) actually means. Stability, indeed, could be in real or nominal terms, against the dollar or a basket of currencies, with very different implications. In fact, the Bank of China already keeps the Chinese currency within a fairly restricted band, and even more tightly since September. However, stable might also mean strong, and the deal could accordingly require China to keep the yuan below 7.0 per dollar. It is unclear though why China should willingly let the US set its exchange rate, in particular when the economy is slowing and appropriate monetary policy would probably weaken the value of its currency.

According to Brad Setser a commitment to a stronger renminbi is an essential part of any deal aimed at reducing US trade deficit with China. Further depreciation cannot be an option on the table of Chinese authorities for the agreement to be credible, as a weaker yuan would further reinforce the existing dynamic which makes US imports from China relatively cheaper and US exports to China relatively pricier.

Mark Sobel endorses a similar viewpoint – a chapter on currency stability is a key part of a trade deal. However, such a chapter must solve several critical issues. First, a deal can be advisory or binding. The US administration, also in light of the record of past non-binding commitments from the Chinese authorities, should require more than agreement on mere guidelines.

Accordingly, China and the US have to agree on ways to enforce such agreement. Second, as mentioned above, the policy translation of currency stability has to be clarified, along with the admissible range of fluctuation for the renminbi-dollar rate. There should also be specific provisions in case a depreciating renminbi were the sole result of American monetary or fiscal policy decisions.

What about the relative bargaining position of the two economic superpowers? Views on the distribution of strengths and weaknesses between America and China also differ.

According to Stephen S. Roach, the American negotiating team has underestimated China’s resilience. True, growth is slower than in the past, but (i) this is not due to American actions on trade and (ii) Beijing still has ample political and economic space at its disposal to pursue its long-term development strategy – differently from Washington.

While exports to the US fell by 3% on an annual basis in December and January, exports to the rest of the world continued to expand. Lower reserve requirements for Chinese banks will also foster credit growth and investment, which is already much higher than in the US (44 % versus 21% of GDP), despite the fact that American capital stock is older and in greater need of replacement. Furthermore, current US growth rates are mostly driven by short-term factors, such as tax cuts, whose positive effect will shortly fade away, exposing the structural weaknesses of the American economy and its trade deficit vis-a-vis more than 100 countries, beside China.

This last point is also highlighted by Martin Feldstein: the American trade deficit is not limited to transactions with China (although it represented two thirds of the total in 2017), and even if China wisely agreed to reduce its current bilateral surplus by increasing its purchases of US products, this would merely shift the distribution of an overall unchanged US trade deficit. On top of that, the critical issue between the two countries is not their trade imbalance but the forced technology transfer from American to Chinese companies, in spite of Xi Jinping’s reassurances to former US president Barack Obama in 2015. Addressing this long-lasting breach of WTO rules should represent the top priority for the American administration.

Some reports, however, convey a substantially different picture of China’s strength and stability. President Xi Jinping recently summoned hundreds of Communist officials to warn them about the risks faced by the People’s Republic of China and to demand their engagement in preventing the unfolding of social unrest. Economic concerns are not limited to the consequences of the trade war, as they include rising local debt and the pursuit of incompatible goals, such as ensuring high and stable employment while deleveraging and tackling inefficient businesses. As a consequence, security and policing have become a prominent feature of Chinese policy directives.

This fear is also due to 2019’s peculiar density in the Chinese symbolic calendar. A century ago, patriotic student protests took place on May 4th. Thirty years ago, the iconic demonstrations in Tiananmen Square started at the beginning of June, representing the biggest challenge ever to the Communist regime.

Mao Zedong is believed to have once said: “There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent.” Seventy years after founding the People’s Republic of China, no doubt he would appreciate the efforts of Presidents Trump and Xi to celebrate the solemn anniversary according to his taste.

https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2019/03/possible-chinese-us-trade-deal.html
13   Shaman   2019 Mar 6, 9:18am  

Heraclitusstudent says
Why is everyone happy ignoring this while bickering about trivial stuff?


Agreed! Clearly this bout of Chinese aggression and extreme nationalism is reason to continue bashing our POTUS Trump! After all, he is resisting the Chinese goals, and we need to bow and scrape to our future Sino-overlords!
ORANGEMANBAD!!
14   MisdemeanorRebel   2019 Mar 6, 9:48am  

Love seeing the Media and Elite dedicated to the Status Quo of massive imports and massive foreign intervention (but no US Border Security), which is Trump's real offense.
15   Tenpoundbass   2019 Mar 6, 10:20am  

Something tells me that if China were Africa and Americans bitched every time Africa pondered on doing something great.

Every Liberal in the world would be screaming Racist.
16   HeadSet   2019 Mar 6, 1:15pm  

MisterLearnToCode says
Love seeing the Media and Elite dedicated to the Status Quo of massive imports and massive foreign intervention (but no US Border Security), which is Trump's real offense.


Yes, serious border security is a major Trump offense, but add to that beating Hillary and being an outsider.
17   Heraclitusstudent   2019 Mar 6, 4:43pm  

Kakistocracy says
Second, Chinese authorities would pledge greater protection of intellectual property rights, so far one of the most acute points of contention between the two countries, given the allegedly China-led theft of US trade secrets and the well-known transfer of technology necessary for American firms to operate in the Chinese market. Third, and relatedly, China is expected to loosen regulatory requirements for foreign companies and to ease authorisations to international investments.

Kakistocracy says
First, the enormous bilateral Chinese trade surplus will be partially countervailed by Beijing commitment to importing a number of US products, in particular agricultural ones (such as soybeans, corn and wheat).


Folks, this is not a trade issue. This is not about the deficit. This is not about the currency. And this is not just about spying.
It is about tech dominance and China will stop at nothing to achieve its goal.
A few giveaways on agriculture are meaningless in this context.

I think any deal is short term and destined to fail quickly because the 2 countries have diametrically opposite goals. The Chinese just have to wait out Trump and sooth the US in the short term, hoping for more benevolence in the future.

Kakistocracy says
According to Brad Setser a commitment to a stronger renminbi is an essential part of any deal aimed at reducing US trade deficit with China.

Also any concession on currency are also meaningless because at this point the Chinese government can't entirely prevent its currency from falling, to the extent it becomes more and more tradable.
They are no longer "manipulating it" by buying dollars. They are facing capital flight and selling dollars.

The situation stinks.
China's current model can't work anymore. They need to move up the chain directly against the US.
In this context the display of hyper nationalism, militarism, and advanced state control doesn't give me a warm and fuzzy feeling.
18   MisdemeanorRebel   2019 Mar 6, 4:53pm  

Heraclitusstudent says
I think any deal is short term and destined to fail quickly because the 2 countries have diametrically opposite goals. The Chinese just have to wait out Trump and sooth the US in the short term, hoping for more benevolence in the future.


They know a Dem Government under Bezos will drop everything and let the theft continue.
19   Heraclitusstudent   2019 Mar 6, 4:57pm  

MisterLearnToCode says
They know a Dem Government under Bezos will drop everything and let the theft continue.

I'm not entirely convinced. As China starts eating into big US tech, the elite will notice and panic. \
CEOs don't care if programmers are replaced with Indians, and computers are all built in China, but once they are directly threatened themselves the response will be different.
20   anonymous   2019 Mar 6, 5:40pm  

Heraclitusstudent says
the elite will notice and panic


Which is why it is being reported that Trump apparently wants to control 5G in a ‘state-run’ socialist twist to American capitalism—and now there are indications that it could become part of the 2020 election campaign.

And if the government owns the 5G network, you won’t have any doubt as to who has access to what you did over it.

https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2019/03/trump-looks-nationalize-5g.html

Covered this earlier this morning, comment #7 in this thread: http://patrick.net/post/1322560/2019-02-21-5g-explained-how-it-works-who-it-will-impact-and-when-we-ll-have-it
21   Shaman   2019 Mar 7, 8:34am  

Kakistocracy says
And if the government owns the 5G network, you won’t have any doubt as to who has access to what you did over it.


And if the government wants to censor conservatives, it won’t be able to, unlike private tech companies which are showing their Nazi colors every day. The government is actually more limited than private business, limited by the Constitution and the will of the people.
22   Heraclitusstudent   2019 Mar 7, 9:29am  

China continues its "divide and conquer" strategy in Europe. Italy set to become first G7 country to endorse China's Belt and Road Initiative - a tool of China to project power and influence abroad - irritating the US, and undermining European unity.

"Italy set to formally endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative"
https://www.ft.com/content/17f91d24-3f60-11e9-b896-fe36ec32aece

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